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Topic:
Moral Paralysis
Country:
USA & Europe
Issue:
Appeasement
Article ID:
79
Title:
Why A “Deal” With Putin Makes No Sense
Author:
S. Frederick Starr
Date:
December 4, 2024
Source:
National Interest
Reference:
Summary:
Quotes:
Russia’s past military defeats usually yield positive consequences. Without delving too far into history, there is the Crimean War of 1852–5, which Russia lost decisively. The resulting collapse led to the abolition of Russian serfdom in 1861 (two years before Lincoln abolished slavery in America), a new legal system, and elective self-government in the provinces, in which both Tolstoy and Chekhov actively participated. Russia’s humiliating defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5 led to further reforms and the establishment of Russia’s first elected parliament, the Duma. Similar moderate reforms might well have followed the defeat of tsarism in World War I. Still, the general chaos of the era soon enabled Vladimir Lenin and the Bolshevik Party to seize power. Stalin’s “Winter War” against Finland ended with a pyrrhic victory and the expulsion of the USSR from the League of Nations. Finally, the Soviet Union’s ten-year-long war in Afghanistan in 1979–1989 ended with an inglorious withdrawal and the collapse of the USSR two years later.There are three main reasons for which the United States and its European allies have rebuffed the Ukrainian government’s call for victory over the aggressors. First, they fear that Putin, in his desperation, might unleash tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine or elsewhere. But many commentators within Russia have noted that Ukraine has already crossed several of Putin’s declared “red lines” without his resorting to nuclear arms. As to the fear that a Russian defeat might lead to “loose nukes,” Russian leaders of all stripes know all too well that if Putin acted on his nuclear threats, the United States would be capable of responding immediately and with devastating effect not only on the Russian military but also the country as a whole. Second, Ukraine’s partners based their strategy purely on their own often inaccurate assessments of the situation on the fighting front. Conditions there are indeed dire. However, the direness extends to both sides, not just the Ukrainians...Third, and most importantly, Russia is fast losing the war on its home front. Strict censorship has, until recently, quashed public discussion of the war itself. However, this repression has been unable to stifle public discussion of the impact of the war on Russia’s provinces, cities, and countryside...So why are Washington officials and America’s friends in Europe straining to achieve a deal with Mr. Putin? Any such deal that does not fully restore Ukraine to the borders recognized by the United Nations will send a clear message not only to Putin himself but also to his waning band of supporters elsewhere. Considering that the Ukraine War has already become the deadliest in Europe since World War II, Western advocates for a deal with Moscow might consider the inevitable concessions to be a small price to pay. Never mind that any such deal will enable Putin to stay in power in the face of mounting domestic opposition, declare victory, and strengthen his axis with China, North Korea, and Iran. It will also force Ukraine, Europe, and the United States to spend more on rebuilding their defenses against a resurgent Russia. And it will invite mischief elsewhere in the world because the United States and West will have revealed themselves as indecisive and overly eager to compromise. It would be far better for the United States and its NATO allies to continue to back the full restoration of Ukraine’s legal borders with military and humanitarian assistance.
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